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Abstract—Online meeting tools like Zoom and Google Meet
have become central to our professional, educational, and per-
sonal lives. This has opened up new opportunities for large scale
harassment. In particular, a phenomenon known as zoombomb-
ing has emerged, in which aggressors join online meetings with
the goal of disrupting them and harassing their participants.
In this paper, we conduct the first data-driven analysis of
calls for zoombombing attacks on social media. We identify
ten popular online meeting tools and extract posts containing
meeting invitations to these platforms on a mainstream social
network, Twitter, and on a fringe community known for orga-
nizing coordinated attacks against online users, 4chan. We then
perform manual annotation to identify posts that are calling for
zoombombing attacks, and apply thematic analysis to develop
a codebook to better characterize the discussion surrounding
calls for zoombombing. During the first seven months of 2020,
we identify over 200 calls for zoombombing between Twitter
and 4chan, and analyze these calls both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Our findings indicate that the vast majority of
calls for zoombombing are not made by attackers stumbling
upon meeting invitations or bruteforcing their meeting ID, but
rather by insiders who have legitimate access to these meetings,
particularly students in high school and college classes. This
has important security implications, because it makes common
protections against zoombombing, such as password protection,
ineffective. We also find instances of insiders instructing attackers
to adopt the names of legitimate participants in the class to
avoid detection, making countermeasures like setting up a waiting
room and vetting participants less effective. Based on these
observations, we argue that the only effective defense against
zoombombing is creating unique join links for each participant.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest promises of the Internet was to enable
quick, easy, and real-time communications, not just via text,
but also audio and video. While it took some time, there
are now numerous online meeting tools like Skype, Zoom,
and Google Meet that are used in a variety of contexts,
both personal and professional. In 2020, society has found
itself increasingly reliant on these online meeting tools due
to the COVID-19 pandemic, with many business meetings,
online classes, and even social gatherings moving online.
Unfortunately, the mass adoption of these services has also
enabled a new kind of attack where perpetrators join and
deliberately disrupt virtual meetings. This phenomenon has
been dubbed zoombombing, after one of the most used online
meeting platforms [1, 2].
To mitigate the threat of zoombombing, security practition-
ers have begun discussing best practices to prevent these attack
from happening or limit their effects. These include requiring
a password to join online meetings, setting up a waiting room
and manually vet participants before letting them in, and not
sharing meeting links publicly [3, 4]. While helpful to keep out
casual and unmotivated attackers, there is an inherent tension
between tightening the security of online meeting rooms and
the need for them to be easily accessible to a number of
people, especially in the case of large public events [1]. Most
importantly, devising effective security policies requires a
good understanding of the capabilities of attackers and of their
modus operandi. To date, however, the research community
lacks a good understanding of how zoombombing attacks
are called for and how they are carried out. For example, it
remains unclear how attackers obtain meeting links in the first
place. This type of knowledge is crucial because, for example,
protecting against attackers proactively bruteforcing the ID
of meeting rooms is very different (and calls for different
countermeasures) than mitigating attacks called from insiders.
In this paper, we perform the first measurement study of
calls for zoombombing attacks on social media. We first select
ten popular online meeting services, spanning a wide range of
target users, from businesses to individuals. We then analyze
the security features that these services offer to their users,
with a particular focus on the mechanisms that allow them
to restrict and control who can join and participate in the
meeting. We next identify posts that contain online meeting
information. We decide to focus on two online services for
this purpose, a mainstream social network like Twitter and
a fringe Web community like 4chan, which was shown by
previous work to be often involved in harassment attacks
against online users [5, 6]. Between January and July 2020, we
identify 12k tweets and 434 4chan threads discussing online
meeting rooms. We then apply thematic qualitative analysis [7]
to identify posts that are indeed calling for a zoombombing
attack, and to further characterize them. We identify 123
4chan threads discussing such attacks as well as 95 tweets.
We then adopt a mixed methods approach to perform further
analysis. We first analyze this dataset quantitatively, looking
at temporal properties of these posts and applying natural
language processing techniques to better understand the topics
of discussion. We then dig deeper into our qualitative analysis
results to get a more nuanced view of the characteristics of the
zoombombing phenomenon. Finally, we discuss our findings
in view of existing countermeasures, reasoning about their
effectiveness.
In summary, we make the following key findings:
• The majority of the calls for zoombombing in our dataset
target online lectures (74% on 4chan and 59% on Twit-
ter). We find evidence of both universities and high
schools being targeted.
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Figure 1: Threat Model for a zoombombing attack. Charlie calls for
an attack against a Zoom meeting created by Alice, by creating a
thread on an online service (e.g., 4chan). Participants then join the
Zoom meeting, report back on the thread about the status of the
attack, and harm the legitimate participants to the meeting.
• Most calls for zoombombing come from insiders who
have legitimate access to the meetings (70% on 4chan and
82% on Twitter). This has serious security implications,
because it makes passwords ineffective to protect the
meeting rooms as attackers can share them with whoever
participates in the attack. In some cases we find that the
insider shares additional information like names of real
students in the class, allowing participants to select those
names and make it difficult for teachers and moderators
to identify intruders.
• Almost all calls for zoombombing target meetings hap-
pening in real time (93% on 4chan and 98% on Twitter),
suggesting that these attacks happen in an opportunistic
fashion and that zoombombing posts cannot be identified
ahead of time, allowing defenders to prepare.
Disclaimer. Due to their nature, zoombombing messages on
social media are likely highly offensive. In this paper we do
not censor any content, therefore we warn the reader that some
of the quotes included in the following sections are likely to
be upsetting and offensive.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first describe the threat model that we
assume for this study. We then describe how we chose the ten
meeting services that we study, and describe their features.
A. Threat Model
We consider a zoombombing attack as being composed of
four phases (see Figure 1), based on anecdotal evidence of how
zoombombing accounts unfold, as well as following empirical
evidence reported by previous research that studied coordi-
nated online aggression, trolling, and harassment on other
social media platforms (e.g., Reddit, YouTube) [5, 8, 9, 10].
Note that in this paper we focus on calls for attacks that aim at
attracting multiple participants; single attacks stumbling upon
meeting rooms and disrupting them are out of scope. In the
following, we describe the four phases in detail through an
example in which Charlie is orchestrating a coordinated attack
against a Zoom meeting created by Alice.
i) Call for attack. Charlie obtains information about Alice’s
Zoom meeting. As we will show later, this is often because
Charlie is a legitimate participant of the meeting (e.g., a
student in an online lecture). Charlie then posts information
about the Zoom meeting on an online service of his choice
(starting an organization thread), asking other members of
the community to participate in a coordinate attack. Previous
research showed that attacks like this are often organized on
polarized Web communities (e.g., /pol/, 4chan’s Politically
Incorrect Board), where the person calling for an attack posts
a link to content on another service that was created by the
victim (e.g., a zoom meeting), followed by an invite to the
person (e.g., through the phrase “you know what to do”) [5, 6].
ii) Coordination. The organization thread created by Charlie
now becomes an aggregation point for attackers, who will
report additional information and coordinate the attack by
replying to the thread. For example, attackers will post details
like a password to access the meeting or personal information
about the host.
iii) Delivery. The attackers will then join the online meeting
and harass the participants, for example sending them hateful
messages, shouting profanities, or displaying offensive or
indecent images through their webcams [1].
iv) Harm. The goal of the attack is to cause harm to the group
of people. Depending on its success and intensity, victims
could suffer serious psychological [11, 12] or even physical
harm [13].
B. Online Meeting Services
To select a representative set of online meeting tools to
study in this paper, we ran Google queries for “online meeting
services” and manually vetted the results for Web pages that
actually advertised a service (excluding, for example, news
articles talking about a certain meeting platform). After this
process, we obtained the list of the ten highest ranked meeting
tools. These services are Zoom, Hangouts, Google Meet,
Skype, Jitsi, GotoMeeting, Microsoft Teams, Cisco Webex,
Bluejeans, and Starleaf.
In the following, we describe the general characteristics of
each of these services (see Table I). We then analyze the
security relevant features offered by the various platforms
(e.g., whether they allow hosts to set a password for meetings).
We are particularly interested in understanding what charac-
teristics of a service might make it a popular target platform
for attackers, or might reduce the risk for a successful attack.
Length of operation. Half of our ten services were established
after 2010, with the notable exception of Webex which started
in the 90s. Major tech companies like Microsoft, Google, and
Cisco have their own solution, with Microsoft and Google hav-
ing two of them (Skype and Teams for Microsoft and Hangouts
and Meet for Google). While Google started retiring Hangouts
in October 2019, we will later show that this platform is still
very much used and many meeting links to it are posted on
social media. There are also companies that focus on online
Platform Est. Headquarters Parent Company Target Users User base Plan
Zoom 2011 US - Both individual and business 300M Free, upgrade available starts from $15/month
Meet 2017 US Google Both individual and business 100M Free, upgrade available starts from $12/month
Webex 1993 US Cisco Business 324M Free, upgrade available starts from $13.5 /month
Jitsi 2017 AU Atlassian Both individual and business - Free
Skype 2003 US Microsoft Both individual and business 100M Free, charge for phone calls
GotoMeeting 2004 US LogMeIn Business - Starts from $12/Month
Teams 2017 US Microsoft Business 75M Free, upgrade available starts from $5 per user/month
Hangouts 2013 US Google Individual 14M Free, charge for phone calls
Bluejeans 2009 US Verizon Business - Starts from $12/Month
Starleaf 2008 UK - Business 3,000 Free, upgrade available starts from $14.99 /month
Table I: Overview of the ten online meeting services studied in this paper.
communication services, like Zoom and Starleaf. During the
coronavirus pandemic, when millions of people have been
forced to work, learn, and socialize remotely, Zoom has risen
to the top, with over 300 million daily participants in virtual
meetings, and also becoming the top target of attack; hence
the phrase “zoombombing.”
User base. Most of the online meeting services are aimed at
business users. While Hangouts is the only service specifically
devoted to individuals, five of them are geared towards both
business and individual users. Based on the most current
data [14, 15, 16, 17] (July 2020), four of our selected online
meeting services have a user base of over 100M (Zoom, Meet,
Skype, and Webex). We hypothesize that the user base of a
service plays a role in which services get attacked the most.
User plan. Most online meeting services provide free ac-
counts for individuals and small companies. GotoMeeting
and Bluejeans, however, exclusively target business consumers
(charging hosts $12/month) and do not provide free accounts.
Teams paid plans are somewhat different, as they are based
not on a per-host basis, but on a per-user basis. Google
Hangouts and Skype are free, but charge for phone calls to
local numbers.
Features. We next analyze the features that are specific to
each online meeting platform, with a particular focus on the
security measures that they put in place to prevent zoom-
bombing. To this end, we compare the features offered to free
accounts. Since GotoMeeting and Bluejeans do not provide
free accounts, they are excluded from this comparison, since
we could not create meetings to check their capabilities. An
overview of the features offered by each platform is reported
in Table II.
First, we look at the security features offered by the meeting
platforms. Nine of the ten services require an account to join
a meeting. This is done to prevent attackers from flooding
meeting rooms and provide some accountability, e.g., sus-
pending misbehaving accounts. Only Jitsi does not require a
registration to join meetings. Authentication-wise, the security
model of online meeting services is the following: anyone with
an account on the platform and who knows the meeting ID
can join the meeting. This is not dissimilar to other security
sensitive services that have been studied by the community in
the past, from online document editing [18] to file download
platforms [19]. To prevent anyone knowing the meeting ID
from joining a room, Zoom, Webex, GotoMeeting, and Blue-
jeans allow hosts to specify a password participants need to
provide upon joining. Only Zoom and Google Meet allow a
waiting room for hostswhi to check identity of participants.
Google Meet automatically admit participants whose accounts
were included in the invitation list into the meeting room and
puts others in a waiting room, allowing the host to let them
in manually. Only Zoom and Webex provide a registration
system with one-time unique links per registrant, which can
help restrict and trace participants. Generally, other meeting
services use unique links for each meeting, with Google
Hangouts and Google Meet allowing a link to be reused
within a 90 day period. Skype does not have a one time
unique link function. Due to privacy concerns, Google Meet,
Google Hangouts, and Jitsi do not allow host to mute all
participates [20, 21]. Google Meet only allows educational
accounts to mute participants [22].
Second, we look at whether services limit the number of
users that can join a meeting, as well as the maximum duration
of a meeting for free users. All the services under study have
a participant limit in their free version. Zoom, Google Meet,
and Webex limit meetings to 100 participants, and Teams only
supports four attendees in its free version. When looking at the
maximum duration of a meeting, we find that three services
(Zoom, Webex, and Starleaf) limit meetings to between 40 and
50 minutes for free users.
III. DATASETS
In this section, we describe the datasets that we used in this
paper as well as our data collection process. We first discuss
how we identify social media posts containing links to meeting
rooms. We then discuss the online services that we collect data
from.
Identifying posts containing meeting URLs. To identify
posts that contain meeting URLs on the online services that
we monitor, we first identify the DNS domains that are
used by the platforms that we are studying. To avoid simple
attempts to evasion, we used regular expressions that only
considered alphanumeric characters and dots. In the case of
Zoom meetings not shared by URL but instead via meeting ID,
after lowercasing and removing non-alphanumeric characters
in the posts, we searched for a pattern with ‘id’ followed by
at least nine consecutive digits by using regular expressions.
We then further filter these by only including posts with the
keyword ‘zoom’ in them. 4chan. 4chan [23] is an imageboard
where users can start a thread anonymously, with other users
Platform Requires account to join in Max particp. Max time Allows password Allows waiting room one-time unique link Mute upon entry
Zoom Yes 100 40min Yes Yes for each particp. Yes
Google Meet Yes 100 Unlimited No Yes No No
Webex Yes 100 50min Yes No for each particp. Yes
Jitsi No 75 Unlimited No No Yes No
Skype Yes 50 Unlimited No No No No
GotoMeeting* No 26 Unlimited Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teams Yes 4 Unlimited No No Yes No
Hangouts Yes 25 Unlimited No No No No
Bluejeans* Yes 50 Unlimited Yes Yes Yes Yes
Starleaf Yes 20 45min No No Yes Yes
Table II: Comparison of the features offered by the online meeting services studied in this paper to free accounts. Services marked with *
do not provide a free version and are only available to hosts who pay a subscription.
commenting on it. 4chan is organized in boards that either
cover different topics of discussion (e.g., Anime & Manga,
Sports) or are created to host more generic discussion (e.g.,
Politically Incorrect, Random). Unlike traditional online ser-
vices, threads on some of the 4chan boards are ephemeral, and
only a fixed number of threads is alive at a time. Once a new
thread i created, the active thread that has least recently been
used is removed from the catalog of live threads. Previous
research showed that 4chan is a popular platform used by
miscreants to carry out abuse, such as organizing coordinated
harassed campaigns [5, 6, 23]. We therefore hypothesize that
zoombombing is widespread on the platform.
We developed a custom crawler following the same method-
ology of previous research on 4chan [5, 24], and collected all
posts between January 1st, 2020, and July 24th, 2020. We then
identify posts containing online meeting links and invitations
following the methodology discussed in the previous section.
Every time we identify a post containing information about a
meeting, we pull the entire thread. In total, we identify 47,221
posts from 434 threads with a URL or an ID for at least one
meeting platform room.
Twitter. Twitter [25] is a microblogging social media platform
on which registered users can share posts publicly or privately.
While private accounts can only reach their followers, public
accounts can reach any user on Twitter. The posts are called
“tweets” and can be re-shared (retweeted) by other users to
share with their followers. Tweets can contain “hashtags”
where users can put the “#” symbol at the beginning of a
word. By using the same hashtags, people can create trends,
which can also be used to look up tweets on the same topic.
Leveraging the Twitter streaming API, a public service that
makes a random 1% sample of all tweets posted worldwide,
we identified 12,077 tweets containing links or IDs to online
meeting rooms. These tweets were posted between January
1st, 2020, and July 18th, 2020. Note that due to limitations
in the Twitter API we could not retrieve any replies to tweets
containing meeting IDs.
Ethics. We acknowledge that data from social media can con-
tain personal information. We adopted standard best practices
to ensure that our study followed ethical principles [26, 27]
In particular, we did not try to further de-anonymize any user.
Since this work only involved publicly available data and did
not require interactions with participants, it is not considered
human subjects research by our institution.
IV. IDENTIFYING ZOOMBOMBING THREADS
While it is relatively straight forward to automatically find
posts that include links to meetings, the challenge is in
determining the intent behind the link being posted, and in
particular whether the post is calling for a zoombombing
attack. We expect that most meeting links on social media
are posted with benign reasons; therefore, to carry out this
study we need a way to separate harmless posts from those
that are calls for zoombombing. Since zoombombing is a
human driven phenomenon, developing automated techniques
to identify posts calling for attacks is challenging and prone to
false positives and false negatives. To avoid these issues, we
perform manual annotation of all posts in our dataset, with the
goal of identifying a reliable ground truth dataset.
In this section, we develop a codebook to guide the thematic
annotation process for our 4chan and Twitter datasets. We
break the development of this codebook in two phases. First,
we perform a binary labeling to determine if posts are indeed
calls for zoombombing or not. As a second step, we further
characterize the posts and threads that contain zoombombing
invitations, with the goal of understanding the behavior of
attackers and the targets that they choose.
To build our codebook and perform annotation we fol-
low the same methodology described in recent security re-
search [7], in which the authors studied posts from online
infidelity forums and their relation with intimate partner
surveillance tools and tactics. More precisely, we follow these
four steps:
1) Four researchers independently screened our dataset and
produced initial codes using thematic coding [28].
2) We then discussed these initial codes and went through
multiple iterations, using a portion of the data to build a
final codebook. The process continued until the codebook
reached stability and additional iterations would not refine
it further.
3) To investigate the common agreement on the codebook
by multiple annotators, we have them rate a portion of our
dataset and discuss disagreements until a good agreement
is reached.
4) We split the rest of our dataset and each annotator labels
one portion of it.
We next describe our process and our codebook in more detail.
Phase I: labeling zoombombing content
As we mentioned, the first phase of our annotation process
deals with identifying social media posts and threads that
contain an invitation to zoombombing. We start by labeling
4chan threads. Following the methodology from [7], we first
randomly choose 10 threads from the 470 threads that contain
a link to a meeting room, and have each author of the paper
review them and discuss them together to build a shared
understanding of what a zoombombing invitation looks like.
From this initial dataset, the authors agreed that two threads
were “bombing” threads (i.e., they were encouraging/calling
for a zoombombing) while the remaining eight were not (i.e.,
“non-bombing”).
We then aim to test each author’s ability to independently
identify bombing threads. To this end, we chose 20 additional
threads (balanced as per the overall distribution of meeting
platform links on 4chan), and had each author label them
as either bombing or non-bombing. We used the following
definition to make a decision: a zoombombing thread should
include an invitation to bomb along with a URL to a meeting
room or a meeting ID. One interesting caveat here is that
while discussing the initial set of threads we noticed that the
invitation to bomb did not necessarily appear in the same post
as the meeting link itself, and thus we added the following
additional condition where applicable: the same user posted
the link or meeting ID and the textual invitation to bomb,
even if they were not in the same post. Note that although
users on 4chan are anonymous, users are giving a unique ID
that identifies them within the same thread [5]. It is important
to note that invitations to bomb are not necessarily made in
an overt fashion. 4chan’s users are well known to use coded
language and slang [6], and thus we relied on our domain
expertise when coding posts that include phrases like “you
know what to do” and “do ya thing.” Finally, because of the
overall uncertainty of things, we decide to be conservative
and label any threads we are unsure about as non-bombing. A
typical bombing invitation looks as follows:
“[ZOOMURL] My English class, come in and
trolley for a while.”
Four authors of this paper independently coded each thread
to determine whether it is bombing related or not. From
this testing phase of 20 threads, we calculated the Fleiss’
agreement score between the annotators and found perfect
agreement (κ = 1.0) [29, 30]. This indicates that all authors
were able to reliably identify zoombombing threads. From
here, we expand our annotation to the full dataset of 434
threads, split evenly between the four annotators.
In the end, we find that 123 of the 434 threads in our
4chan dataset are bombing threads. As seen in Figure 2, nearly
half (43.96%) of the Zoom meeting links in our dataset were
determined to belong to a bombing thread, and a majority
(59.72%) of Google Meet links appeared in bombing threads.
On the other hand, Google Hangouts and Skype links are
mostly posted with benign intentions.
Figure 2: Ratio of bombing and non-bombing posts on 4chan.
Figure 3: Ratio of bombing and non-bombing tweets on Twitter.
We follow the same labeling procedure for Twitter. From our
preliminary screening of the tweets, we find that a large portion
are non-English. Thus, we restrict our analysis to English
tweets only from our total 12,077 tweets, which leaves us
with 3,510 candidate tweets.
A challenge that we face when labeling tweets is that Twitter
is a much different platform than 4chan in its user base
and general tone. 4chan is dominated by trolling and irony,
and veiled calls to join meetings can often be interpreted
as bombing invitations. Here is an example of a bombing
invitation from 4chan:
“Ok retards, this is an id of a zoom web lessons.
Do your worst [ZOOM ID] [ZOOM PASS-
WORD].”
On the other hand, Twitter is a general audience social
network, therefore we expect most meeting invitations to be
benign. For example, this is a bombing invitation from Twitter:
“Raid this class as fast as u can....
#zoomcodes #zoomclasscodes #zoomclass #zoom
[ZOOMURL]”
To reflect this difference and avoid potential false positives,
we decide to be stricter when determining if a tweet is a
zoombombing invitation. More precisely, a bombing tweet
needs to meet the following two criteria:
• An invitation to bombing with a link (invitation text
usually comes with a link)
• A clear indication of bombing, such as “raid,” “bomb,”
“troll,” “discord,” “disruptive,” and “make fun of it.”
As with 4chan, we are generally conservative in our labeling
and default to non-bombing in uncertain cases.
From the 3.5K English tweets, we randomly sample 500
so all services were equally represented (i.e., balanced with
respect to services). From this 500, we manually select 20
tweets, which four coders independently determined whether
they were a bombing tweet or not. The inter-rater reliability
again shows perfect agreement (Fleiss’ κ = 1.0). Because of
the high agreement scores on the initial testing set, as well as
the agreement on the 4chan ratings, we had a single annotator
label the remaining 3,490 tweets in this dataset. Note that this
is a much quicker process than on 4chan, since the coder had to
look at single tweets instead of entire, and often long, threads.
In the end, we find that 95 out of the 3,510 candidate
English tweets are bombing tweets. From Figure 3 we can see
that zoombombing on Twitter is less pervasive than on 4chan.
In particular, of the 3,039 Zoom related candidate tweets, 75
are labeled as bombing, and 20 of the 157 Google Meet tweets
are bombing. We found no bombing tweets for the other eight
meeting tools.
Phase II: Characterizing zoombombing
While labeling threads and tweets as bombing or not is
vital to understanding the problem, it does little to characterize
the actual bombing activity itself. In this phase we aim to
understand the process of a bombing event by analyzing the
behavior that goes on in bombing threads.
We began by having four annotators go through the labeled
bombing threads/tweets as determined by the Phase I labeling.
This was a relatively loose process where the goal was to get a
general sense of what is going on. Next, the annotators met and
discussed their observations. In general there was agreement
between the annotators of a clear trend of insider complicity in
bombing of online classes in particular. After several rounds
of discussion, we derived four, high level properties relevant
to zoom bombing threads and tweets: 1) thread structure (only
applicable to 4chan threads), 2) link information, 3) invitation
information, and 4) interaction (only applicable to 4chan
threads).
Thread structure: New threads on 4chan are created when a
so called “Original Poster” creates an “Original Post” and the
thread constitutes replies to this post (NB: 4chan threads are
flat) [5]. Thus, the first post in a thread usually represents the
topic of the thread.
We code the following characteristics of a thread:
1) Whether the content of the first post is a zoombombing
invitation. This indicates whether or not the thread was
created primarily to act as a bombing thread as opposed
to organically evolving into one.
2) The length of the thread (i.e., the number of posts), which
indicates the thread’s popularity.
3) The number of bombing invitation links, which is indica-
tive of how the thread evolved with respect to bombing.
Link information: According to our definition of a bombing
thread/tweet, both 4chan and Twitter posts need to include a
video conference invitation link or meeting ID to be considered
a bombing thread. For certain meeting platforms (e.g., Zoom)
we can derive two additional pieces of information from
meeting links directly: 1) institutional information (i.e., who
is hosting the meeting) and 2) password protection.
For some platforms, we can automatically identify
password-protected links by looking at a password parameter
in the URL (e.g., https://zoom.us/j/123456789?pwd=12345aA
bBcC678). When coding messages manually, we also look at
the presence of passwords in the text of posts. Institutional in-
formation provides us additional information on the victims of
attacks. To gather this information, we need to manually look
at the URL (e.g., http://UNIVERSITY.zoom.us/j/XXXXXX,
and search for its associated institution. We record each
institution, its type (e.g., University), and country.
Invitation information: As noted previously, there are plenty
of legitimate reasons to post a link to a video conference, and
thus a posted link itself is not sufficient to say that an attack
has occurred; this is why we require additional text calling for
an attack. During our initial examining, we noticed that there
was often additional information embedded in the bombing
invitation itself, e.g., temporal details as well as hints at the
existence of insiders.
“[ZOOMURL] this class is up the tuesdays at
11:00 am UTC-5 crash this class plz.”
For temporal information, we manually read the bombing
invitation and label the meeting time according to three codes
1) future event, where the poster indicates the attached link
will be active at some point in the future, 2) live event, where
the poster indicates the meeting link is active and that bombers
should join “now,” and 3) not sure, where there was no clear
indication of when the link would be active. This temporal
information is an indicator as to whether or not a bombing
attack has been planned, or if it is an opportunistic attack.
Our preliminary analysis indicated that many zoombombing
invitations are created by insiders, for example students in the
case of college classes. To better understand insider complicity,
we label each bombing post or thread as either 1) insider
or 2) non-insider. To be labeled as insider, the bombing
invitation should include text like “my teacher” or “our class,”
provide a password for the video conference (either explicitly
in post text or implicitly in the link to the meeting), or
give suggestions on what names bombers should select when
joining the call (a tactic used to make it harder for legitimate
meeting attendees/hosts to determine that joining bombers are
not supposed to be there). Annotators recorded the details of
what led to any insider label applied. Again, we conservatively
label threads as non-insider if there is any doubt.
Interaction: For 4chan, we are able to collect entire threads
discussing zoombombing. For these threads, we read the whole
thread and record the following characteristics of the thread
discussion:
• Time interval: the interval between the bombing invitation
post and the first interaction post by other users (this
characteristic is automatically calculated);
• Problem feedback: participants reporting problems about
their zoombombing attempts, for example being unable
to join the meeting room, or being kicked out by the host;
• Toxic speech: participants insulting the host of the meet-
ing with profanities or hate speech;
• Crime scene feedback: reports on successful attacks with
details on what happens;
For phase II, four raters independently rated 20 randomly
chosen threads from 123 bombing 4chan threads and 20
random tweets from 95 bombing tweets from Twitter. Inter-
rater reliability showed a perfect agreement in both sets of
threads (Fleiss’ Kappa 1.0). We then split the rest of the dataset
into 4 groups, with each rater separately coding one group.
V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
To better understand the zoombombing phenomenon, we
first start by quantitatively analyzing the 123 4chan threads
and 95 tweets that we identified as part of the coding
process, comparing them with posts and threads containing
non-bombing meeting links. We focus our analysis on three
aspects: 1) understanding which services are targeted the most
by zoombombing 2) examining how zoombombing unfolds
temporally and 3) using natural language processing tech-
niques to quantify the content of zoombombing threads.
A. Targeted services
We observe that the platforms with a larger user base (see
Table I) seem to be attracting more zoombombing attacks. In
particular, we find 129 bombing links on Zoom, 66 on Google
Meet, 10 on Webex, 7 on Jitsi, 3 on Skype, 2 on GoToMeeting,
and 1 on Teams, while there are none for Hangouts, Bluejeans,
and Starleaf.
B. Temporal Analysis
Figure 4 plots the weekly occurrences of bombing and
non-bombing posts on Twitter and 4chan. From the figure,
we see that posts with meeting links became more prevalent
(especially on Twitter) as the COVID-19 shutdown began in
March 2020 (shown in the figure with blue line1). On 4chan,
we observe a spike in benign posts containing meeting links
around New Years Eve 2020, attributable to users organizing
social gatherings as well as increased activity of a far-right
group on the following week. Generally speaking, zoombomb-
ing as a phenomenon barely existed before the quarantine. We
observe a decline of the phenomenon in June 2020, potentially
linked to school holidays; this is in line with the fact that we
observe that most calls for zoombombing target school lectures
and college classes, as discussed later in Section VI-A.
1https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/09/colleges-move-classes-
online-coronavirus-infects-more
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Figure 5: Hour Distribution of zoombombing posts. Note that we
did not discard multiple posts that contain the same zoombombing
link.
Next, we plot the number of posts per hour of the day for
4chan posts and tweets with bombing links in Figure 5. On
Twitter, we find that zoombombing activity does not exhibit
clear diurnal patterns. On 4chan, bombing posts are mostly
shared from 08:00 to 23:00 UTC. We did not encounter any
zoombombing tweet that specified a location and only 13
zoombombing posts had country information on 4chan (8
USA, 1 Indonesia, 1 Bulgaria, 1 Turkey, 1 Chile and 1 Italy).
Considering the lack of diurnal patterns in Figure 5, we can
derive that zoombombing calls are not a localized problem.
Temporal analysis of 4chan threads. To better understand
zoombombing behavior, we analyze the threads on 4chan
where zoombombing links were posted. This allows us to get a
quantitative understanding of how discussion of zoombombing
activity unfolds on the platform. Based on our manually
labeled dataset, we extract 123 threads, which contain 2,693
total posts. We compare these 123 threads to the 311 threads
(44,528 posts) that included a meeting link but were not
bombing threads. Finally, we also compare to a baseline of
4chan posts chosen by sampling threads at random (without
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Figure 7: Feedback time between the posting of a zoombombing
invitation on 4chan and the first reply to the thread.
replacement) on a per-day basis such that we have the same
number of baseline threads per day as we have threads where
a meeting link was posted.
Figure 6 plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the duration of threads in our dataset (defined as the difference
in the timestamp of the last post and the timestamp of the
original post). Recall that threads on 4chan are ephemeral,
and once a thread is not active for a while it gets pruned and
no further posts can be made [5]. From the figure, we observe
that bombing threads have a shorter lifetime than other threads:
50% of bombing threads are active for less than 5 minutes,
compared to 30 minutes for randomly sampled threads, and
two hours for non-bombing threads. That said, we do have a
long tail with about 10% of bombing threads lasting over 2
hours, compared to 7 hours for sampled threads and 12 hours
for non-bombing threads.
In our threat model, threads become an aggregation point for
attackers, and so understanding the feedback Charlie receives
from the bombers he is trying to recruit is important. Thus,
Figure 7 plots the delay between the bombing link being
posted on 4chan and the first reply. From the figure, we see
that 79% of zoombombing threads receive their first reply
within 10 minutes. One explanation for this is that calls for
zoombombings might be time sensitive; indeed in SectionVI-B
we show that many of our attackers are inviting bombers to
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Figure 8: CDF of Interpost Arrival Times for bombing & non-
bombing threads
join live meetings/classes. We then look at the interpost arrival
time between each post in a thread. Similarly, Figure 8 plots
the CDF of interpost arrival times, which is the time between
consecutive posts in threads, for bombing and non-bombing
threads. For most threads the elapsed time between consecutive
posts in bombing threads is similar to sampled threads while
being higher compared non-bombing threads. One explanation
for this is that non-bombing meeting links tend to be posted to
organize social gatherings, and thus tend to show up in more
popular, faster moving threads. An alternative explanation is
that while the zoombombing attack is happening 4chan users
are slower in replying in the thread because they are busy
performing malicious activities in the meeting room.
C. Characteristics of zoombombing links
In this section we focus on what we can learn by analyzing
the zoombombing links, in particular whether they contain
information about the victim organizations and if they include
a password as a URL parameter.
Targeted organizations. We want to understand what orga-
nizations are victims of zoombombing. Two of the services
(Zoom and Webex) that we study allow organizations to set up
a subdomain that identifies them (for example https://virginia.z
oom.us/j/123456789 to identify the University of Virginia on
Zoom and https://pacificbuddhistacademy.my.webex.com for
the Pacific Buddhist Academy). We find that most of the zoom-
bombing links posted on 4chan and Twitter are generic and do
not contain subdomains that are specific to any organization:
only 12 links contain specific subdomains to 10 institutions,
and 2 links contain specific subdomains to 1 institution on
Twitter. In particular, we find that 8 zoombombing links on
4chan belong to education institutions while there are none
on Twitter. One of these is a high school located in the US
(Evergreen PS in Washington), four are universities in the
US (e.g., Arizona State University), and three are universities
outside the US (e.g., Concordia in Canada). In Section VI-A
we will show that the text of zoombombing posts often further
identifies the institution or organization that the zoombombing
link belongs to.
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Figure 9: Occurrences of zoombombing links with and without
passwords.
Bombing Non Bombing
4chan Twitter 4chan Twitter
Word Sim. Word Sim. Word Sim. Word Sim.
virtual 0.834 zoomcodes 0.860 nihilist 0.628 live 0.264
lecture 0.820 boys 0.819 cia 0.561 virtual 0.249
lesson 0.777 zoin 0.814 join 0.552 pm 0.247
class 0.774 zoomclasse 0.812 neo 0.549 zoom 0.239
crash 0.755 girls 0.802 program 0.505 link 0.239
join 0.697 pm 0.792 nazi 0.502 join 0.229
webex 0.685 raiding 0.785 goat 0.482 please 0.208
meeting 0.682 random 0.771 glownigger 0.478 detail 0.195
conference 0.681 shit 0.771 fbi 0.455 march 0.192
password 0.675 join 0.769 autistic 0.374 reminder 0.178
Table III: Top 10 most similar words (by cosine similarity) related
to online meeting links in Bombing & Non Bombing Threads and
Tweets.
Password protection. As we discussed in Section II-B, two
of the ten online meeting services (Zoom and Webex) allow
hosts to protect their meetings using passwords. In the case
of Zoom, the password can be embedded in links as a URL
parameter (for example https://zoom.us/j/123456789?pwd=1
2345aAbBcC678). We find that 20 out of the 123 bombing
invitations on 4chan, and 64 out of the 95 ones on Twitter
include a password. This is interesting, because the password
option was added by Zoom after the quarantine started to
curb zoombombing. In fact, we find that zoombombing posts
containing passwords are concentrated toward the latter part
of our timeline (see Figure 9). This is a worrying trend, since
as we will confirm in Section VI-A it is an indication that
many attacks are called for by insiders who have legitimate
access to the meetings, questioning existing security measures
and calling for rethinking them.
D. Content Analysis
After looking at timing information and at the characteristics
of URLs, we focus on analyzing the language of social
media posts containing zoombombing invitations on Twitter
and 4chan, together with their threads on 4chan. To this end,
we leverage word embedding models (i.e., word2vec [31]) to
quantitatively learn about the context in which zoombombing
links are discussed. Intuitively, this allows us to identify
common themes used in discussions where the links appear.
To build our models, we first replace any meeting link with a
keyword “meetinglink.”
For both 4chan and Twitter, we trained two word2vec mod-
els, one for posts (and threads in the case of 4chan) containing
zoombombing links, and one for posts and threads containing
benign meeting links. On 4chan, we used a window size of 7
by taking into consideration words that appear at least 5 and
84 times, respectively, for bombing and non-bombing threads,
maintaining the ratio of the total amount of posts left after
preprocessing. To avoid the effect of common/unnecessary
words in our model, we removed stop words, punctuation,
other URLs, mentions, posts with only one word, and exact
quotes of previous posts in the case of threads. We also
lemmatized the posts and converted all text to lowercase, to
avoid weakening the influence of words that are actually the
same words or inflected form of the same word. On Twitter
we applied the same pre-processing techniques as 4chan, and
in addition we removed emojis, numbers, and some Twitter-
related keywords like RT and FAV while also removing non-
alphanumeric characters from words. Since tweets are usually
shorter than 4chan posts, to build our word2vec models we
used a window size of 5. We keep words that appear at least
7 times for non-bombing tweets and words that appear at least
once for bombing tweets considering the same ratio we applied
for 4chan.
Since online meeting links do not have a fixed position in
posts, but attackers place them arbitrarily as a word inside of
a sentence, we decided to use the Continuous Bag-Of-Words
Model (CBOW)[31] for training our word2vec models.
Most representative words. After building our models, we
want to identify the words that are closer to zoombombing
and non-bombing links on both Twitter and 4chan. To do this,
we looked for the most similar words to ’meetinglink’ with
respect to the cosine similarities of the vector embeddings of
words in our trained models.
As seen in Table III, the most representative words for
zoombombing and non-bombing content are very different. On
4chan, we notice that most zoombombing words are related to
education (e.g., “lecture,” “class”) or business meetings (e.g.,
“meeting,” “conference”). On Twitter, we observe references to
education as well (“zoomclass”) as well as keywords related to
attacks (e.g., “raiding”). For non-bombing content, on Twitter
we can observe that most keywords are related to conference
meetings, and reflect the fact that public meeting URLs are
often posted on the platform. On 4chan, we observe that
non-bombing meeting URLs are often related to trolling and
political discussion.
Visualizing discussion themes. We next aim to identify
recurring “themes” in zoombombing content. To this end,
we visualize the relationship between the words related to
online meeting links following the methodology of Zannettou
et al. [32]. From the word2vec models we trained, we create a
two-hop ego network around “meetinglink” where words are
nodes, and the edges are weighted with the cosine similarity
between the word embedding vectors of those words; we keep
any edge whose weight is greater than or equal to a pre-
defined threshold, and visualize this as a graph. For each graph,
we elect the threshold as the value that results in a graph
with 100 nodes (for ease of representation). We then detect
“communities” of words using the Louvain algorithm [33],
and display them using Gephi’s ForceAtlas2 algorithm [34].
Figures 10 and 11 show the results of this analysis for
zoombombing invitations in 4chan threads and Twitter posts,
respectively. Intuitively, each colored community can be in-
terpreted as a “theme” that is featured prominently in these
posts. Looking at the 4chan graph (Figure 10) we can see
that many of the themes feature educational topics (e.g., the
red community with “spanish,” “course,” and “skype” and the
purple community with “university,” “college,” and “class”).
We can also see a community (orange) where users talk
about security issues/conspiracies as we can derive from words
like “ccp,” “tiktok,” “spyware,” and “ban.” This indicates that
conspiratorial content is not only commonplace in regular
discussion on 4chan, but is also featured in zoombombing
content. See the following post for example:
“If you do the research you’ll see our MSM is
in bed with the CCP. This is being utilized for
propaganda purposes just like tiktok. I work with
a bunch of regressed and they all love posting
on tiktok. The users of these applications have
close to zero foresight when it comes to Intel
collection in any fashion from any party. Kind of
we are fucked because Jews take chinese money
as investments in their companies.”
On Twitter (Figure 11) we can again see themes that
cover online classes (e.g., the green community with “class,”
“history,” “math”). We also see a number of keywords that are
used as hashtags on the platform to ensure that the calls for
zoombombing obtain more visibility (e.g., “zoomcodeclass,”
“zoombomb,” “zoomraids”).
For completeness, Figures 12 and 13) show the graphs for
non-bombing threads on 4chan and non-bombing tweets on
Twitter. As it can be seen, the themes in these cases are more
varied.
VI. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING FORUM
CONTENT
Our quantitative analysis highlighted several interesting
aspects of zoombombing invitations and their discussion. In
particular, we found evidence that online classes in particular
are targeted by attacks, and we found several meeting pass-
words included in invitations, which could be an indicator
that attacks are called for by insiders who have legitimate
access to the meeting rooms. When dealing with online activity
carried out by humans, however, quantitative analysis can
only identify general trends, and lacks the nuance required
to provide a better understanding of the problem. In this
section, we answer deeper questions via a more thorough
qualitative analysis informed by our quantitative results. As
explained in Section IV this analysis was conducted by having
four authors of the paper manually annotate the dataset.
Where appropriate, our analysis covers zoombombing posts
on Twitter and 4chan, while for some of the analysis (for
example the one analyzing back and forth communication
between attackers) we only rely on 4chan threads. Based on
our threat model (see Section II-A), we analyze attacks across
four phases: i) Call for attack, ii) Coordination, iii) Delivery,
and iv) Harm.
A. Phase I: Call for attack
In this phase, an attacker posts a call for an attack on an
online platform.
Targeting the class room. In Section V-C we showed that we
could quantitatively identify 8 academic institutions targeted
by zoombombing attacks on 4chan. In addition to information
that can be directly extracted from the URL of the bombing
link, many bombing posts include additional text indicating
that online classes are the target. For example, “lecture,”
“teacher,” “class,” etc. show up regularly in these threads.
We find that 91 of our 123 zoombombing threads on 4chan
target online classes. Of the 32 remaining threads, three target
business meetings, and the target of the remainder could not
be conclusively determined. On Twitter, we find that 56 of our
95 bombing calls target schools.
Evidence of insiders’ complicity. In Section V-C we showed
that 11 zoombombing links on 4chan included passwords,
indicating that who called for the attack was a legitimate
participant in the meeting (e.g., a student in the class). When
annotating the threads, we find 9 additional zoombombing
threads including a password in the body of messages. In total,
this accounts for 20 of our 123 threads on 4chan. For Twitter,
we showed that 64 out of the 95 tweets included a password
in the zoombombing link.
There are additional indicators that can be used to quali-
tatively determine if an attack is called by an insider. In this
section, we look for two indicators: 1) whether the language
of the call of the attack suggests that the attack is called by
an insider and 2) whether whoever calls for an attack shares
knowledge about the meeting that only an insider would have.
For the first aspect, we look for language like “my lecture,”
“my colleague’s presentation,” “my company’s meeting,” etc.
58 zoombombing threads on 4chan and 19 zoombombing
tweets on Twitter include such language indicating that the
attack is called by an insider. In many cases, the users
calling for the attack provide additional information that only
an insider would know. In 8 zoombombing threads and 8
zoombombing tweets, the attacker asks others to use a certain
name when joining the meeting to avoid being identified as
an intruder and removed.
“[GOOGLEMEETURL] name yourself “WONG
SHIU PING TONY” all caps or she wont let you
in.”
“Also please use real-sounding names.”
In 11 threads we learn that the attacker is an insider from
their interaction with other users.
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Figure 10: Words and themes associated with zoombombing links
on 4chan.
meetinglink
zoomcodes
boys
zoin
zoomclasse
girls
pm
raiding
random
shit
join
ansari
fuckingstuff
zoompickuplines
fun
party
maths
funny
zoomraids
fast
zoomclasscodes
zoommeeting
share
zoomclass
finish
zoomraid
joinnn
zoom
raid
plsgooglemeets
conversation
salma
raids
today
rooom
mis
turn
quick
zoomparty
history
clasw
ceaab
juliet
njys
bomb
scheduleinvite
aa
lavender
ft
meeting
spam
would
ok
-PRON-
fuck
class
whatever
zoomcodeclass
physicsenter
please
zoomid
porn
troll
virtualeclase
madisoncantrellnames
zeu
zoommid
zoomcode
googlemeet
help
zoombomb
zoombombed
kbo
zoomraiding
put
zoombombing
adam
elseyosif
asap
classroombruh plzaye
math
crash
passurj
xdzoomcodess
zoomclase
find
zoommeete
Figure 11: Words and themes associated with zoombombing links
on Twitter.
“Same school as you, different major. Someone
wrote "NIGGERS" in my zoom class with the
annotate function and started a zoom fight.”
Together with all information from both meeting links and
post text, we identify 86 out of 123 zoombombing threads on
4chan that appear to have been posted by insiders (38/54 for
Zoom, 35/46 for Google Meet, 8/10 for Cisco Webex, 3/3 for
Skype, 0/2 for GoToMeeting, 2/7 for Jitsi, and 0/1 Teams). For
Twitter, we find that 78 out of the 95 zoombombing tweets
were posted by insiders.
Failed calls to attack. While 100 (out of 123) of our threads
did start with an invitation to bomb, 46 (out of 100) of these
received no further replies. I.e., the call for an attack seems
to have been stillborn. For the threads with replies, 54 (out of
77) were started with an invitation to bomb and 23 (out of 77)
were created with more general topics of interest (e.g., politics,
COVID-19, etc.) which were later converted into bombing
threads. Threads with general topics tend to attract more posts
than bombing threads.
B. Phase II: Coordination
After posting an invite to a zoombombing, attackers coor-
dinate to carry it out. To better understand this, we look for
temporal information on when the attack should be carried out
in both 4chan threads and tweets.
Crimes of opportunity. Considering that most of the zoom-
bombing links target online classes, and that these occur at
regularly scheduled times, there is a question as to how much
premeditation goes into a bombing attack. On the surface, it
seems plausible that attacks could be planned days, and even
weeks in advance. To dig deeper, we looked at the text posted
along with a link and determined whether or not the invite was
for a live meeting, or one that was scheduled to take place in
the future. I.e., are attackers asking people to bomb right now
or planning a bombing that is going to happen later? We found
that 115 of 123 bombing links on 4chan and 93 of 95 links on
Twitter came along with a clear implication that the meeting
was live at the time of posting. We find 8 future links among
123 links on 4chan and 2 out of 95 links on Twitter. A future
link example from 4chan is:
“RAID THIS BOOMER Wednesdays 10:00-10:45
[INSTITUTIONAL ZOOMURL]”
Refusing to participate. We find 20 threads on 4chan where
users openly refuse to join into the attack, calling it unethical
or referring to the fact that 4chan users are not the insider’s
personal army (NYPA – Not Your Personal Army). This
indicates that not all users on 4chan are willing to participate
in these attacks, and is particularly interesting because it is a
possible explanation for at least some failed attacks: users do
not reply because they reject the idea of being a troll in the
service of another user.
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Figure 12: Words and themes associated with online meeting links
on non-bombing threads on 4chan.
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Figure 13: Words and themes associated with online meeting links
on non-bombing tweets on Twitter.
“[ZOOMURL]please spam this online class”
“I’m not downloading shit”
“Nypa faggot”
C. Phase III: Delivery
In this phase, the attackers join the online meeting and begin
their harassing and disruptive actions. As part of our analysis,
we find discussion of how the attacks went down in replies
within the bombing threads on 4chan.
Quick action. We compare the time interval between when
the link is posted and the first feedback on the attack. Of 123
bombing threads on 4chan, we find 37 with clear feedback
related to the bombing. According to this analysis, a zoom-
bombing attack finishes within 20 minutes. An example of
attack feedback on 4chan is as follows:
19:51:59 “Join a teachers zoom [ZOOMURL]”
20:05:18 “What the fuck is this? Who are these
people?”
20:07:43 “quickly screencap it. They kicked me
out instantly.”
Problem feedback. For 24 threads we find participants re-
porting problems with the zoombombing invitation.
“Raid our school live call class, i believe in you
faggots. [GOOGLEMEETLINK]”
“It says someone has to allow me to join, some
shit like that”
“this meeting has been locked by the host. Sad!”
D. Phase IV: Harm
Finally, we want to understand the toxic speech that happens
during attacks, together with what actions attackers carry out.
Toxic speech. We find 14 4chan zoombimbombing threads
containing toxic content including racism, sexism, or hateful
words.
“[SKYPEURL] Anyone wanna join our online
lesson? Our teacher is black. Its gonna be in 20
mins.”
“NIGGER.” “That is absolutely a ‘he’, no matter
how the swine identifies.”
“What the fuck, I swear I spotted a beard on that
chin.”
On Twitter, we did not find any toxic tweets among the
95 zoombombing tweets. However, recall that on Twitter we
only retrieved the call for attacks and do not have any feedback
(e.g., the replies to those tweets).
Crime scene feedback. On 4chan, we find 15 threads con-
taining feedback from the zoombombing attack, providing us
with a better view of what happens during these attacks. Here
are some examples:
“Hard working he’s probably the kind of teacher
who sits reverse on a chair and is up to date with
the cool kids.”
“HAHAHAHA that was great.”
“Party’s over my dudes, IT is here shutting down
the stream, we had a good laugh.”
“Did you hear me saying nigger?”
“Ayone heard me farting.”
“Yeah everyone heard and saw the chat and vc
lmao.”
“I didn’t hear that, maybe not loud enough but
there was a bunch of rambling about the numbers
on screen and then someone started farting and the
class was just dying of laughter.”
“Nice bro.”
‘Totally lmfao. Best class disruption ever.”
VII. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have presented a data-driven analysis of
the emerging phenomenon of zoombombing. Our findings
improve the understanding of who the people calling for
zoombombing attacks are and how they operate. In the fol-
lowing, we first discuss the implications of our findings to
existing mitigations against zoombombing, and propose some
best practices to protect online meeting rooms. We then discuss
the limitations of our study and some future work directions.
Implications for zoombombing mitigation. After the rise
in popularity of online meeting tools, researchers have been
looking at the privacy risks linked to online meeting [35].
At the same time, researchers, law enforcement, and the
online meeting providers themselves have been publishing
best practices to avoid zoombombing [1, 3, 4]. These include
not posting meeting links publicly, protecting meeting rooms
to control who can get in, and reducing the capabilities of
participants, like muting them upon joining and disabling
screen sharing and screen annotations.
The main assumption behind existing guidelines to prevent
zoombombing is that attackers will find meeting links online,
or that they will bruteforce their ID. Given this threat model,
protecting meetings with passwords makes sense. However,
our findings show that most of the calls for attacks we observe
come from insiders. This makes password protection ineffec-
tive, because the insider will share the password with the other
attackers. Having participants join a waiting room and vet
them before letting them in can be a more effective mitigation,
although it inevitably increases the workload of meeting hosts,
requiring moderators specifically checking the meeting room
in the case of large meetings. Our analysis however shows
that insiders often share additional information with potential
attackers, for example instructing them to select names that
correspond to legitimate participants in the meeting. This
reduces the effectiveness of a waiting room, because it makes
it more difficult for hosts and moderators to identify intruders.
Providing a unique link for each participant reduces the
chances of success of zoombombing attacks. If the meeting
service still allows multiple people joining with the same link,
at least this gives some accountability, since the meeting host
can identify who the insider was based on the unique link
used by attackers to join. An even better mitigation is to allow
each participant to join using a personalized meeting link. This
way, as long as the insider joins the meeting unauthorized
people will not be able to join using the same link. While this
mitigation makes zoombombing unfeasible, not all meeting
services have adopted it. At the moment of writing, only Zoom
and Webex allow per-participant links that allow a single user
to join at a time. To do this, Zoom requires participants to log
in, and checks if the unique link is the same that was sent to
that email address as a calendar invite. We encourage other
meeting platforms to adopt similar access control measures to
protect their meetings from insider threats.
Additionally, we find that zoombombing attacks usually
happen in an opportunistic fashion, with insiders asking others
to join meeting happening in real time. This reduces the
effectiveness of proactive measures like monitoring social
media for calls for future attacks.
Limitations and future work. As any data-driven study,
our study is not exempt from limitations. We only have a
1% sample of Twitter available, therefore our zoombombing
results on the platform are a lower bound of the actual extent
on the problem. Additionally, the API limitations prevent us
from collecting replies to the zoombombing tweets, allowing
us to only get a partial picture of how attacks unfold on the
platform. On 4chan, users are anonymous. We therefore cannot
trace per-user behavior, and this prevents us from observing
serial offenders calling for multiple attacks over time. Finally,
our analysis is limited to calls for attacks and responses to
such calls on social media, but we are unable to observe
what happens in the actual meeting rooms. Future work could
develop alternative study designs that allow analyzing the
attack on the online meeting platform itself, for example by
collecting and analyzing recorded online meetings that were
bombed, or by interviewing victims of zoombombing. This
would also allow a better understanding of the mental and
emotional toll that zoombombing victims have to go through.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Coordinated malicious activity on social media. The secu-
rity community has extensively studied automated malicious
behavior on social media, mostly focusing on bots sending
spam [36, 37, 38] and on malicious accounts colluding to
inflate each other’s reputation [39, 40, 41]. The mitigation
systems proposed to detect and block this type of activity
rely on the fact that these operations are large scale, rely
on automated methods, and are carried out by single entities.
Therefore, synchronization features can be used to distinguish
between benign and malicious activity [42, 43, 44]. Alterna-
tively, systems have been proposed that identify common traits
in massively created fake accounts, for example an anomalous
fraction of followers to friends or a large set of accounts
created around the same time [38, 45, 46, 47, 48].
More recently, the community’s focus expanded to looking
at coordinated malicious campaigns that are not carried out by
automated means, but rather by humans controlling a small
number of inauthentic accounts. This includes conspiracy
theories being pushed on social media [49, 50] and influence
campaigns by foreign state actors [51, 52]. While not as
automated as large-scale bot activity, these campaigns still
show coordination, which can be leveraged for detection [53].
Coordinated online harassment and aggression. A closer
line of work to the problem studied in this paper looks at
coordinated behavior geared toward harassing victims online.
Kumar et al. [9] measure the problem of brigading on Red-
dit, where the members of one sub-community (subreddit)
organize to disrupt another community by posting offensive
messages and prevent it from continuing its normal operation.
Hine et al. [5] study the activity of 4chan’s Politically Incor-
rect Board (/pol/), showing that members of that community
often call for attacks against people who posted videos on
YouTube, ending up harassing the poster in the comments
section of the video. Mariconti et al. [6] develop a multi-
modal machine learning system able to predict which videos
are likely to receive this kind of hate attacks, in the hope of
aiding moderation efforts.
Zannettou et al. [54] investigate a similar phenomenon,
studying the effect of posting a URL to a news article on
4chan and Reddit. They show that posting URLs to certain
types of news outlets results in a sudden increase in the hate
speech on the comments to that article.
Snyder et al. [55] study the problem of doxing, in which
attackers post information about a victim, calling for people
to attack that person through multiple media (e.g., on multiple
social networks or through email), sometimes even transcend-
ing to the physical world.
Tseng et al. [7] analyze five forums in which miscreants
share and discuss tools and techniques that can be used to spy
on their partners and further harass them.
Our work builds on previous research on coordinated ha-
rassment by studying the emerging problem of zoombombing.
Unlike previously studied threats, we show that zoombombing
attacks are often called by insiders; this has important implica-
tions when designing security mitigations against the problem.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we performed the first data-driven study of
calls for zoombombing attacks on social media. Our findings
indicate that these attacks mostly target online lectures, and
that they are mostly called by insiders who have legitimate
access to the meetings. We find that insiders are commonly
sharing confidential information like meeting passwords and
the identify of real participants in the meeting, making com-
mon protections against zoombombing ineffective. We also
find that calls for zoombombing are usually targeting meetings
happening in real time, making the proactive identification of
such attacks challenging. To protect against the threat, we en-
courage online meeting services to allow hosts to create unique
meeting links for each participant, although we acknowledge
that this has usability implications and might not always be
feasible.
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